PROTECTING THE IVORY TOWER:
SENSIBLE SECURITY OR INVASION OF PRIVACY?
Stephen D. Lichtenstein*
Our beginningpoint is a recognition that the modern American college is not
an insurer of the safety of its students. Whatever may have been its
responsibility in an earlier era, the authoritarian role of today's college
administrations has been notably diluted in recent decades. Trustees,
administrators, and faculties have been required to yield to the expanding
rights and privileges of their students. By constitutional amendment, written
and unwritten law, and through the evolution of new customs, rightsformerly
possessed by college administrationshave been transferredto students. College
students today are no longer ninors; they are now regardedas adults in almost
every phase of community life.

I. INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding the sentiment expressed in the opening quotation,
universities 2 should owe a duty to exercise a degree of ordinary care to
those with whom they have created a special relationship, including
students, faculty, administration, staff, and visitors to the campus.
Generally, there is no duty recognized by tort law3 obligating one party to
protect another in the absence of a definite relationship between the parties
that would justify on public policy grounds the obligation to protect an
individual from the harm of others.4
Arguably, the source for this duty and the obligation of the university to
protect its students is the educational contract between the student and the
university. 5 The essence of the contract is that the student pays tuition and
*Professor of Law, Department of Law, Taxation and Financial Planning, Bentley University (Waltham,
MA). The author wishes to thank Jonathan J. Darrow, Senior Research Consultant at Bentley
University, for his assistance in preparing this manuscript.
1. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-39 (3d Cir. 1979).
2. The term "universities" as used herein includes colleges and other institutions of higher education.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
4. Id.; see also id. § 315.
5. Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Mangla v. Brown Univ.,
135 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that the student-university relationship is essentially contractual
in nature and that the terms of the contract may be stated in handbooks and manuals); see also Rendell-
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other expenses and the university, in return, provides an education. The
university then creates, implements and discloses its policies and rules, as
well as the procedures for enforcing those policies and rules, in the context
of explaining the rights and responsibilities of the university and its
students. These policies may also afford students privacy rights not
otherwise available under federal or state laws. The policies are usually
disclosed in the student handbook, which is posted on relevant university
websites, and available in other forms of university communications.
Courts have granted private universities considerable latitude in drafting
the language of their respective handbooks.6 This latitude is premised on
the unique nature of educational contracts that require the terms to be
construed so as to allow the university to satisfy its educational obligations.'
It would seem that the handbook could serve as a primary source for the
university to express its electronic surveillance and other campus
monitoring policies. In order to ensure awareness, the university should
publicize these policies to the university community and do so in a
minimally invasive manner. For example, universities need not list every
punishable act that could result in disciplinary action. Rather, the language
should be specific enough to indicate that students are expected to respect
the rights of others,8 while fostering an atmosphere that can avoid or limit
the types of campus tragedies that are described below.
Ideally, a balance should be struck between creating an atmosphere of
safety and security, through the use of best practices or methods (including
but not limited to campus surveillance and monitoring), and preserving
student privacy and other protected rights. Whatever safety and security
measures are taken by the university, there is no guarantee that acts of
violence on campus will be prevented in the future. Moreover, such
measures cannot end civil suits alleging negligence for failure to exercise
ordinary care 9 in taking appropriate precautions, or those alleging
unwarranted intrusions into student privacy rights resulting from university
actions.

Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 41 (1982) (noting that a private school is not fundamentally different
from many corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts).
6. Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 242 (D. Vt. 1994).
7. Id. at 243.
8. Id. at 244-45.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (describing the standard as "that of a reasonable
man under like circumstances").
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II.

INFAMOUS INCIDENTS OF CAMPUS VIOLENCE

It should be noted that the following description of campus tragedies will
not focus on the psychological and mental profiles or pathologies of
perpetrators and their possible motives. These dimensions have been welldocumented and are best left to analysis by experts in the relevant field.' 0
Amy Bishop, a Harvard educated geneticist and assistant professor of
biology at the University of Alabama at Huntsville, was denied tenure in
early 2009. In appeal of the adverse tenure decision, she armed herself with
a gun and appeared before a faculty meeting in February 2010, where she
subsequently shot and killed three of her colleagues and wounded three
others.'
Unfortunately, the incident at the University of Alabama is only one of
many similar campus tragedies involving violence and murder. A few of
the more infamous of these tragedies are described here. One early
example involved Charles Whitman, a twenty-five year old engineering
student at the University of Texas in Austin. On August 1, 1966, he armed
himself and climbed to the University's observation tower, where he
randomly shot and killed thirteen people, wounded thirty-one, and then
committed suicide. 12 He had killed his wife and mother only a few hours
earlier. 13 On November 1, 1991, Gang Lu, a twenty-eight year old former
Ph.D. student in physics at the University of Iowa, entered two campus
buildings shooting and killing four faculty members and one student, and
wounding another.51 4 He was unhappy that his dissertation did not win a
prestigious prize.

10. See JAMES ALAN Fox ET AL., THE WILL TO KILL: MAKING SENSE OF SENSELESS MURDERS

(Allyn

& Bacon, 3d ed. 2007); see also Jeffrey Kluger, Inside a Mass Murderer'sMind, TIME, Apr. 19, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0.8599.1612368.00.html; Thomas Frank, Campus
Killers'HintsIgnored,USA TODAY, June 12, 2007, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-06-12-campus-killers-N.htm.
11. Sheila Dewan & Liz Robbins, A Previous Death at the Hands of Alabama Suspect, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2010, at A20.
12. See
The
Madman
in
the
Toier, TIME,
Aug.
12,
1966,
available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842584,00.html.
13. Id.
14. Michael Marriott, Iowa Gunman Was Torn by Academic Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1991, at
A12.
15. The D.C. Spriestersbach Dissertation Prize, which was awarded each year by the University of Iowa
Graduate College to recognize outstanding doctorate-level research. See Univ. of Iowa
D.C.
Spriestersbach Dissertation Prize, http://www.grad.uiowa.edu/awards/the-dc-spriestersbach-dissertationprize.
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The deadliest campus shooting in modern history16 occurred April 16,
2007 when Sueng-Hui Cho, a twenty-three year old student at the Virginia

Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), shot and killed
thirty-two people and wounded another twenty-five before committing
suicide. 17 The evidence as to his motive indicate that Cho was patently shy,
anti-social, and frequently engaged in aberrant behavior, including the
stalking of fellow classmates.

8

Two additional incidents bear mentioning. The first, and perhaps the
most infamous, involved the Columbine High School killing spree in
1999.19 On April 20, 1999 Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, two seniors at
Columbine High School in Columbine, Colorado, entered the campus
armed with an arsenal of weapons. They killed twelve students and one
teacher, wounded an additional twenty-three individuals, and then
committed suicide. It appears they were influenced by neo-Nazi literature

and sought revenge for being socially excluded by other Columbine
students.20
The second event occurred on April 5, 1986 and involved Jeanne Clery, a
twenty-nine year old freshman at Lehigh University who was beaten, raped

and murdered while sleeping in her dormitory by another Lehigh student

16. Alessandra Stanley, Deadly Rampage and no Lose for Words, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2007, at A19.
17. lan Urbina, Report on Virginia Tech Shooting Finds Notiication Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009,
at Al.
18. See VA. TECH REV. PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 53 (2007), available at
http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/reportl I CHAPTER IV.pdf The report raised questions about
Cho's mental stability, which had resulted in a hearing to determine if he should be committed for
treatment. Id. at 47. Efforts to inform his parents and others at Virginia Tech were impeded by Cho's
privacy rights under federal law. Id. at 38; see Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of
1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (2006); see also Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 34 C.F.R. § 99.5
(2010). If Cho's mental status posed a physical threat to others, concerns for Cho's privacy rights and
the confidentiality of his mental condition would be considered in light of Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), and the holding of the Virginia Supreme Court in Nasser v. Parker,
455 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 1995). In Tarasoff,the court ruled that where a mentally disturbed patient was in a
doctor-patient or hospital-patient relationship, and the patient indicates the intent to harm another, the
doctor or hospital is required to warn the intended victim. Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 340. Many states have
adopted a similar rule. See Charles Patrick Ewing, TarasoffReconsidered,36 AM. PSYCHOL. Assoc.
112 (2005). However, in Nasser, the Virginia Supreme Court disagreed with Tarasoff, in finding that
the duty to warn depends on whether the doctor or hospital has actually taken charge of a mentally
disturbed patient rather than whether a doctor or hospital-patient relationship exists at all. 455 S.E.2d at
505. In Cho's case, he had been diagnosed as depressed and a danger to himself. See Mike Gangloff&
Laurence Hammack, No Teeth in Virginia Mental Health Laws, ROANOKE TIMES, May 8, 2007,
available at http://www.roanoke.com/vtreactions/wb/ 116052. Accordingly, he was ordered by Virginia
Tech health care providers to seek outpatient treatment. Id. Unfortunately for the victims of his
atrocity, Cho was released but never sought the recommended treatment. Id.
19. See Michael Janofsky, Year Later, Columbine Is Learning to Cope While Still Searching for
Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at A12; see also DAVID CULLEN, COLUMBINE 85 86 (2009).
20. Janofsky, supra note 19, at AI2.
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unknown to her.2' Following the death of their daughter, her parents,
Connie and Howard Clery, discovered that there had been numerous violent
crimes committed on the Lehigh campus in the three years prior to their
daughter's murder.22 In the wake of Clery's brutal rape and murder, and
concerned with campus security in general, Congress held a number of
hearings culminating in the passage of the Student Right-to-Know and
Campus Security Act of 1990.23 In 1998, this Act was renamed the Jeanne
Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy25 and Campus Crime Statistics
Act of 1990,24 to be further discussed below.
It should be emphasized that the above tragic incidents describe the most
serious acts of campus violence-those resulting in murder. Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statistics reflect an expanded scope of
campus violence by including in their data crimes involving force or the
threat of force 26 and non-negligent manslaughter, along with murder,
forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault. 27 Of course, analogous to the
general community, numerous other types of crimes are committed on
campuses, including but not limited to burglary, motor vehicle theft,
stalking, vandalism, and arson. 28 These crimes are serious attacks on
person and property, but none is more egregious than the alarming number
of sexual assaults and attacks on women like Jeanne Clery that studies
reveal pervade university campuses.
Just how pervasive is the problem of sexual assault? 29 The U.S.
Department of Justice indicates that one out of every five female university
students will be the victim of a sexual assault at one point in a typical five-

21. Mark Fritz, The Politicsof ParentalGrieving,L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1999, at A].
22. S. Daniel Carter, Covering Crime on College Campuses, 88 QUILL 32 (2000).
23. Student Right-To-Know and Campus Security Act, Pub L. No. 101-542, § 204, 140 Stat. 2381,
2385 87 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006)) (requiring institutions of higher
education to collect and make public campus crime statistics, including sex offenses).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f(15 ) (2006).

25. See infra Part III.
26. FED. BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008-

VIOLENT CRIME

(2009), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/violent-crime/index.html [hereinafter
VIOLENT CRIME REPORT].

27. Id. (follow "Universities and Colleges" hyperlink under "Browse By"; then follow "table 9"
hyperlink; then follow "Data Declaration" hyperlink for a general comment regarding nature and extent
of FBI data).
28. See DIANNA A. DRYSDALE ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV., CAMPUS ATTACKS: TARGETED VIOLENCE

7 (2010),
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/campus-attacks.pdf.
29. See Elizabeth Redden, Making Women Safer on Campus, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Sept. 7, 2007,
www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/07/kentucky
AFFECTING INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 6
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year matriculation. 30 Equally alarming, approximately 80 to 90 percent of
victims will know their assailant. 3' The aftermath of these assaults result in
a number of physical and traumatic consequences.32 The onus to prevent,
protect, and educate against these heinous attacks resides primarily with the
university. Once again, whatever efforts are employed, universities must be
mindful of the balance between the need to create an atmosphere of safety
and security while protecting legitimate privacy rights. It should also be
mentioned that acts of violence against female students (and others on
campuses) include forms of sexual harassment. A 2006 survey conducted
by the American Association of University Women Education Foundation
(AAUW) found that, in May 2000, nearly two-thirds of female students
experienced acts of sexual harassment, 33 one third of which involved
physical contact.34 Universities receiving federal funds are required to
implement the provisions of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. 35 The major requirements are to create an effective sexual
harassment policy that informs the campus community how and where to
file a complaint, as well as the procedure the university will follow to
investigate and take appropriate corrective action concerning the
allegations. In cases of sexual harassment against a student, whether by
another student, faculty member or university employee, the university may
be held liable for monetary damages.36

30. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE

DOING ABOUT IT 2 (2005), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/205521.pdf, see also CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: A FRUSTRATING SEARCH FOR JUSTICE, (2010), available at

http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/campus assault!.
31. Id.
32. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY,
at viii (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl /nij/grants/221153.pdf (reporting that 25-45

percent of rape victims will suffer from non-genital trauma, 19-22 percent will suffer from genital
trauma, up to 40 percent will be infected with sexually transmitted diseases, and 1-5 percent will get
pregnant).
33. See CATHERINE HILL & ELENA SILVA, AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., DRAWING
THE
LINE:
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
ON
CAMPUS
2
(2005),
available at
http://www.aauw.org/leam/research/upload/DTLFinal.pdf; see also id. at 15 fig. 15.

34. Id. at 17.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
36. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998); Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). The Court in each of these cases limited the liability standards of
private actions. See, e.g., Gebser at 283; Davis, 526 U.S. at 693. For the process to be followed for
administrative enforcement of Title IX violations, as contrasted with private actions, see U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL
EMPLOYEES,
OTHER STUDENTS,
AND THIRD PARTIES,
at iii-iv (2001),
available at

http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/shguide/index.html
(providing that the process of
administrative enforcement require enforcement agencies such as the Office for Civil Rights to inform
schools of Title IX violations and to seek voluntary corrective actions before seeking termination of
federal funds or other enforcement procedures including referral of complaints for judicial action to the
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A. Safe but Not Safe Enough: The Need for Increased Campus Security
Although university campuses may be safe in comparison to urban
communities, both evidence and anecdote suggest that the risk to the
university community remains unacceptably high. The FBI lists the number
and types of campus violent acts known to law enforcement for all public
and private universities and colleges in every state.37 In 2008, the
University of Alabama at Huntsville reported one violent act; the University
of Texas at Austin, eleven; the University of Iowa, fourteen; Virginia Tech,
three; and Lehigh University, five.38 Of course, the total number for all
campuses within the state are significant. For example, for the various
University of Texas campuses, the total was 212, 39 while for all Virginia's
campuses, it was 113.40 These statistics coupled with the examples of the
campus tragedies described above strongly suggest the need for universities
to be proactive in their efforts to protect the campus, while respecting the
legal rights of those who are the subject to those efforts.
There are two major means used by universities to protect campus
security. In the wake of Columbine, many universities have installed
campus video cameras as a means to deter criminal activities and ensure
safety and security.
A second means is to monitor electronic
communications, such as e-mail.
Universities that have their own campus police departments have a
responsibility to install and monitor cameras 42 in appropriate public areas
without violating privacy rights. These locations include public buildings,
such as classrooms, libraries, dining rooms and other common areas. By

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division).
37. VIOLENT CRIME REPORT, supra note 26 (follow "Universities and Colleges" hyperlink under
"Browse By"; then follow "Table 9" hyperlink).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Privacy Rights Clearing House, Fact Sheet 29 para. 8 (Nov. 2005),
http://www.privacyrights .org/fs/fs29-education.htm#8.
42. See,

e.g.,

SUNY

COLL. ONEONTA,

ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE POLICY

1, available at

http://www.oneonta.edu/security/documents/SurveillanceVideoPolicy.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
The College atOneonta reserves the right to place cameras on campus where necessary
and appropriate. This policy applies to all personnel, departments, offices, and other
subdivisions of the College in the use of electronic recording and surveillance.
[..
.I
The College at Oneonta respects the privacy of university community members and is
sensitive to balancing that privacy with safety needs on campus.
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contrast, dorm rooms, restrooms, and other private areas where an
individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy ' , 43 are generally offlimits to surveillance. Exceptions may be made if the purpose of the
intrusion relates to a specific threat of imminent and serious crime or to an
emergency situation.
In the case of dorm rooms, the university may include in the student
housing agreement a provision specifying the reasonable conditions under
which an inspection of the room by university officials may occur. For
example, Boston College reserves the right for campus officials to enter
resident student rooms and conduct a plain view search for reasons of
health, maintenance, community standards (including safety and discipline),
or inspections. 44 Regular inspections are conducted by staff in all areas. 45
Further, except in cases of an emergency when university officials cannot
search the contents of a student's dorm without their consent, a duly
authorized search warrant from a local court or issued by the Vice President
for Student Affairs may be used.46 It follows that students would enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their dorm room analogous to what is
expected in an apartment or hotel and what can be characterized as the
student's "home away from home. ' 4' However, the ever-present threat of

43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz was convicted of
transmitting wagering information across state lines using a telephone in a private phone booth that had
been bugged by the FBI with an electronic device placed outside the booth. Id at348 (majority
opinion). The Court held that his Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures had been violated. Id. at 360. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan introduced the idea that
individuals are entitled
to a reasonable expectation of privacy incertain
circumstances. Id. (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan opined that there is a twofold requirement for this expectation to apply. Id.
at361. First, a person must exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Id. While generally a
person's home generally is a place where one expects privacy, "objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself
has been exhibited." Id.
44. BOSTON COLL., CONDITIONS FOR RESIDENCY 2007-2008: RIGHT OF ENTRY, available at
http://www.bc.edu/offices/reslife/Iifeinhalls/communityexp/conditionsO708.html#RIGHTOFENTRY
(last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272 A.2d 271, 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970); see also Piazzola v.
Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997 (D.N.H. 1976).
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recurring acts of campus violence, coupled with the events of September
11, 2001, have reduced the nature and extent of this expectation;48 though
they have certainly not eliminated it.
One critical question with respect to video surveillance is to what degree
has the installation of campus cameras reduced the nature, extent, and threat
of campus violence? Some pundits assert that there is no conclusive
evidence that cameras are a panacea for reducing the incidence of campus
violence. For instance, Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies
at the Cato Institute, 49 states that security cameras "may be good forensic
tools-after something happens, they'll tell you what happened, and in the
rare case where a terrorism case fails, they can be useful to help track down
the perpetrators. But they do not provide protection against attacks, and
that's a key distinction."5 ° Others ponder whether the sense of security
created by cameras creates an atmosphere of suspicion for some and
mistrust for others. In order to foster positive attitudes toward safety
measures, universities that use camera surveillance should create and
disseminate their privacy and security policies and, at a minimum, describe
the rights and responsibilities of students, faculty and other personnel, as
well as notify them of the purposes for which the video files can be used,
who will have access to the files, how long and where they will be kept and,
in the case of faculty or staff, whether the information contained in the files
will be used for performance evaluations.51 The privacy provision within
the policy should indicate that the cameras will be used to monitor only
suspicious and unlawful activities.
Technological advancements will create new tools for campus video
surveillance. One such tool was recently developed by Blackboard, Inc., a
company that provides course and classroom management software

48. See Robert C. Power, Changing Expectations of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 16 WIDENER
L. J. 43 (2006); see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C.,
and 47 U.S.C.). The Act contains ten titles and expands the ability of law enforcement agencies to
conduct searches of wireless communication and financial or medical records of those suspected of
planning or having committed acts of terrorism. Id. The Act further enhances the sharing of
information among law enforcement agencies. Id.
49. Edward H. Crane founded the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. in 1977 as a non-profit public
policy research foundation. For additional information on the Cato Institute, see About Cato,
http://www.cato.org/about.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
50. Marcus Barum, Eye on the City, Do Cameras Reduce Crime?, ABC NEWS, July 9, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=3360287&page-I.
51. Id. For an example of a more complete surveillance privacy and security policy, see CORNELL
UNIV.,

POLICY

8.1:

RESPONSIBLE

USE

OF

VIDEO

SURVEILLANCE

SYSTEMS

(2009),

http://www.dfa.comell.edu/dfa/cms/treasurer/policyoffice/policies/volumes/riskandsafety/upload/vol8 I
.pdf
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programs 2 Blackboard's new service allows campus security officials to
view live and recorded video of individuals at the entrance points to certain
buildings (dormitories, dining rooms, libraries, athletic facilities, parking
lots, and other designated areas) by using entrance activation cards supplied
by Blackboard. The service can be added to a university's existing
Blackboard software system and also provides an additional means by
which to alert the campus of imminent dangers or threats. If a university
decides to add this software to its cache of video surveillance tools, notice
should be included in its security and privacy policy. This service should
only be used for security and protection of the campus and not as a means
by which to intrude upon privacy rights.
The second popular method employed by universities to help ensure
safety is the monitoring of university-owned computers and other electronic
equipment in order to access e-mail, text messages, and other forms of
electronic communications.
Every second of every day, huge volumes of instant messages and
information are transmitted via e-mail 53 and short message services (SMS)
using such devices as mobile phones. One recent survey indicates that the
number of text messages sent on a daily basis now exceeds calls made and
received by phone 4 University students engage in these methods of
communication in the form of text messages, tweets, chat rooms, web logs
("blogs"), wikis, message boards, and social networks 5

52. Posting of Josh Fischman to Chron. of Higher Educ. Blog,
http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/blackboard-gets-into-video-surveillance/3747 (Mar. 10, 2008,
11:15 EST).
53. The Radicati Group, an independent technology market research firm, estimated 247 billion e-mail
messages would be sent worldwide in 2009 and that the number would grow to 507 billion by 2013.
Press Release, Radicati Group, E-mail Statistics Report, 2009-2013 (May 6, 2009), available at
http://www.radicati.com/?p=3237.
54. For the second quarter of 2008, Americans placed and received only 204 calls per month compared
to an impressive 357 text messages. See In US., Text Messaging Tops Mobile Phone Calling,
NIELSENWIRE, Sept. 22, 2008, http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online mobile/in-us-text-messagingtops-mobile-phone-calling/.
In addition, during the first half of 2009, over 822 billion text messages were sent (nearly 5 billion per
day); see also Press Release, Cellular Telecomm. & Internet Ass'n, The Wireless Association
Announces Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey Results (Mar. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.ctia.org/media/press/body.cfm/prid/1936.
55. See generally popular Web sites for doing so, including Facebook.com, YouTube.com,
Twitter.com, and Linkedin.com.
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How effective a tool is monitoring for providing increased protection and
safety? According to a 2009 survey,5 6 46 percent of adult Americans
believe that universities do not sufficiently monitor student behavior; 30
percent believe they do, while 45 percent remain undecided.5 7 Forty-three
percent also believe universities provide sufficient safety measures, thirtyone believe otherwise, while 26 percent are undecided.5 8 Statistics such as
these suggest broad popular support for an increased role of universities in
the protection and safety for the more than 17.8 million undergraduate
students. 59
The rights and obligations associated with the use of university-owned or
issued computers and related electronic equipment, including the right of
universities to monitor and access the content of electronic communication,
are generally governed by a university's terms of use policy. The terms and
provisions of a usage policy should clearly indicate what constitutes
acceptable use and the circumstances which precipitate a university's right
to monitor and access online activities of its students and others within the
campus community. 60 Many such policies allow a university to examine a
56. Forty-Six Percent Say Colleges Don't Monitor Student Behavior Enough, RASMUSSEN REPORTS,
Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public content/lifestyle/general lifestyle/august 2009/46 say colleg
es don t monitor student behavior enough.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. DRYSDALE, supranote 28, at 5.
60. See,

e.g.,

BENTLEY

UNIV.,

POLICIES

GOVERNING

TECHNOLOGY

RESOURCES

AT

BENTLEY,

http://www.bentley.edu/computing-use/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
Bentley reserves the right to examine the contents of personal computers used by faculty,
staff and students or other computers attached to our network, without prior consent or
knowledge of the individual being investigated. Bentley also reserves the right to
confiscate computers used by faculty, staff and students. Cooperation may include, but is
not limited to, providing transaction logs, copies of electronic of electronic mail
messages, data files, usage records, hardware, account and password information, or
other information as required by those authorities. Those who are financially responsible
for the perpetrators, such as parents or guardians, may also be held accountable.
Id.;
see
also
BENTLEY
UNIV.,
ELECTRONIC
MAIL
POLICY,
http:/infoprivacy.bentley.edu/policy/electronic-mail-policy.
Employees and students should be aware that e-mail sent and received using the
university's computer resources is neither confidential nor private.... The university
itself may, upon reasonable grounds, access your e-mail files at any time, without prior
notice to the student or employee, but with approval from two vice presidents.
As a general rule, the university will not read or make available the contents of any
individual's electronic mail unless there are reasonable grounds to do so. Reasonable
grounds for doing so may include but are not limited to: ensuring system integrity (such
as tracking viruses or corrupt messages), complying with legal obligations (such as
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computer's contents without the prior consent or knowledge of the user.61
If online activities reveal potential illegal activities involving campus or
outside law enforcement, then sufficient probable cause is established for
the issuance of a warrant. Otherwise, both the warrant and seizure can be
challenged.
For example, in United States v. Angevine, 2 the University of
Oklahoma's computer terms of use policy provisions prohibited the use of
its computers to access obscene material and allowed the University to
randomly inspect the files downloaded on computers issued to faculty and
others employed by the University.63 The policy also cautioned that
information transmitted on its network either in transit or in storage was not
confidential and that any data stored on its computer hardware was property
of the University. 64 Angevine was a professor at the University, and with
the cooperation of his wife, the Stillwater Police Department was able to
obtain a search warrant to search and seize his computer, which ultimately
revealed over 3,000 pornographic images of young boys. 65 After
Angevine's arrest, he moved to suppress the evidence seized by the police,
alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and claiming a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his computer. 66 The
District Court denied the motion, whereupon Angevine conditionally pled
guilty to possession of child pornography, retaining his right to further
appeal the denial of the motion. 61 Ultimately, the trial court convicted him
of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252(A)(a)(5)(B). 68 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of the
motion to suppress and found that under the provisions of the computer
terms of use policy, Angevine had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 69
Accordingly, the police did not violate his rights under the Fourth
Amendment. 7°

subpoenas)... investigating complaints of possible violation of university policy...
resolving disputes or grievances between individuals at the university . .. conducting
judicial review cases ... [or] continuing business after a person is terminated from their
position or leaves Bentley.
Id.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
281 F.3d 1130, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. To Search and Seize or Not to Search and Seize, That Is Calixte
The amount of credible evidence necessary to satisfy the probable cause
requirements for a warrant to search a student's dorm room and to seize his
computer and other electronic equipment was addressed in the case of In re
Search WarrantExecuted on March 30, 2009 at the Residence of Riccardo
Calixte.71 Calixte also raised privacy issues in light of the relevant laws
governing privacy rights related to campus surveillance and monitoring. 72
Riccardo Calixte, a Boston College student majoring in computer science
and an employee in Boston College's Information Technology Department,
was having social problems with his ex-roommate Jesse Bennefield. 73 As a
result, Bennefield made several serious allegations against Calixte to Kevin
Christopher, a detective with the Boston College Campus Police.74 The
most serious of the allegations accused Calixte of having a reputation as a
hacker, illegally hacking75 into Boston College's grading system and
changing student grades, illegally downloading movies and music, 76 and
using the Boston College computer system to send a mass e-mail in which
he stated that Bennefield was gay and participated in a gay dating website. 77
Boston College, however, found no evidence that Calixte changed grades;
nor did it find any other evidence to support Bennefield's allegations,
except that one of Calixte's e-mail messages sent from his laptop falsely
indicated that Bennefield was gay. 78
Based on this evidence, Christopher and Boston College believed there
was sufficient probable cause that Calixte had used technology in violation
of Boston College's terms of use policy and Massachusetts laws by
71. In re Riccardo Calixte, No. SJ-2009-0212, at I (Mass. Dist. Ct. May 21, 2009) (order granting
motion to quash search warrant and denying motion to suppress evidence), available at
http://www.eff org/files/filenode/inresearchBC/SJCcalixteorder.pdf [hereinafter In re Riccardo Calixte].
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id.
75. For a discussion of a hacking incident involving the theft of the personal data of over 160,000
university students contained on the university's server, see Michelle Meyers, U.C. Berkeley Computers
Hacked, 160,000 at Risk, CNET NEws (May 8, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10236793-

83.html.
76. In re Riccardo Calixte, No. SJ-2009-0212, at 1. Universities should include provisions in their

computer terms of use policies addressing and prohibiting illegal downloading and file sharing of music,
DVDs and other digitally stored information. See Jonathan Saltzman, Student Must Pay $675Kfor
Songs, BOSTON GLOBE , Aug. 1, 2009, at Metro 1. The $675,000 damage award was subsequently
reduced to $67,500. See Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Slashes Downloading Penalty, BOSTON GLOBE, July
10, 2010, at Metro 1.
77. In re Riccardo Calixte, No. SJ-2009-0212, at 3.

78. Id.
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engaging in fraudulent and unauthorized use of Boston College's computer
services, 79 as well as unauthorized access of its computer systems. 80 One of
the relevant provisions of Boston College's terms of use for its technology
and information resources 81 stated that Boston College would not monitor,
access or disclose the contents of a user's electronic data, software and

communication files, unless it obtained the proper approval and an urgent
and legitimate need existed sufficient to offset Boston College's
commitment to protecting the user's privacy.8 2 The policy also provided for

disciplinary action including criminal prosecution under both state and
federal law.83

Detective Christopher obtained a search warrant from the Newton
District Court.8 Pursuant to the search warrant, the Campus Police searched
Calixte's dorm room and seized his personal laptop, two other laptops

79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 33A (2010).
Fraudulent Obtaining of Commercial Computer Services; Penalties: Whoever, with intent
to defraud, obtains, or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets another in obtaining, any
commercial computer service by false representation, false statement, unauthorized
charging to the account of another, by installing or tampering with any facilities or
equipment or by any other means, shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of
correction for not more than two and one-half years or by a fine of not more than three
thousand dollars, or both. As used in this section, the words 'commercial computer
service' shall mean the use of computers, computer systems, computer programs or
computer networks, or the access to or copying of the data, where such use, access or
copying is offered by the proprietor or operator of the computer, system, program,
network or data to others on a subscription or other basis for monetary consideration.
Id.
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120F (2010).
Unauthorized Access to Computer System; Penalties: Whoever, without authorization,
knowingly accesses a computer system by any means, or after gaining access to a
computer system by any means knows that such access is not authorized and fails to
terminate such access, shall be punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for
not more than thirty days or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or both. The
requirement of a password or other authentication to gain access shall constitute notice
that access is limited to authorized users.
Id. -[E]ach unauthorized 'login' to a computer system constitutes a separate offense, and...the number
of documents accessed during any given 'login' is not relevant in determining the number of
convictions." Commonwealth v. Piersall, 853 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
81. See BOSTON COLL, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND BUSINESS CONDUCT: USE OF UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGICAL
AND
INFORMATION
RESOURCES
(1995),
available
at
http://www.bc.edu/offices/policies/meta-elements/pdf/policies/I/1-100-025.pdf
[hereinafter
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND BUSINESS CONDUCT].
82. Id. The privacy provision of the policy also allows Boston College to monitor, access and disclose
contents in order to: maintain system integrity (e.g., track viruses); protect system security; protect
University property rights; and meet legal obligations (e.g., respond to a subpoena). Id.
83. See id ("Reporting Suspected Violations").
84. See Kevin M. Christopher, Application and Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant,
No. 0912SW03 (Mar. 30, 2009), availableat
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2009-03-30Application%20for%20 Search%20Warrant.pdf
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either belonging to Boston College or other students, two iPods, two cell
phones, a digital camera, hard drives, flash drives, compact disks, and other
electronic equipment.85 As a result, Calixte's attorneys along with the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 86 filed a motion with the Newton
District Court to quash the search warrant and to recover his property. 87
The court decided that the allegations and resultant investigation provided
sufficient probable cause for the warrant and the motion to quash was
denied. 8
On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts was ordered to cease any further forensic
analysis of the property seized. 89 The court allowed the motion to quash the
search warrant and the motion to return the property. 90 The court reasoned
that the main focus of the affidavit for the search warrant was the e-mails,
which was most likely illegal. 91 Based on the allegations related to the email messages, the search warrant was obtained even though the affidavit
failed to indicate the time or origin (e.g., whose computer was used to send)
of the alleged illegal e-mail messages and where or when Bennefield
witnessed their mailing.9 2 The affidavit also failed to substantiate the
allegations that Calixte hacked into Boston College's faculty database in
93
order to change grades and to illegally download movies and music files.
Apparently, the campus police did not fully investigate the allegations,
causing the court to characterize the evidence submitted in the affidavit for
the warrant as "sketchy, 94 and "troublingly weak., 95
It further
characterized the efforts of the police investigation as "lacking ' '96 in that

85. See In re Riccardo Calixte, No. SJ-2009-0212, at 3 (Mass. Dist. Ct. May 21, 2009) (order granting
motion to quash search warrant and denying motion to suppress evidence), available at
http://www.eff org/files/filenode/inresearchBC/SJCcalixteorder.pdf
86. The EFF was founded in 1990 by Mitchell Kapor, of Lotus Corporation and ON Technology, and
John Perry Barlow, a writer and lyricist. EFF's History, http://www.eff.org/about!history (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011). EFF is a nonprofit organization whose stated purpose is to "defend[] your rights in the
digital world." About EFF, http://www.eff.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
87. Brief of Petitioner, In re Search Warrant Executed on March 30, 2009 at the Residence of Riccardo
Calixte No. SJ-2009-0212 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2009) (No. 0912SW03), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/inresearchBC/calixteappeal-042709.pdf
[hereinafter
Brief
of
Petitioner].
88. Id.at 5.
89. Inre Riccardo Calixte, supra note 71, at 10.
90. Id.
at 11.
91. Id.at 6.
92. Id.at 6 7.
93. Id.
at 7.
94. Id.
at 8.
95. Id.at 10.
96. Id.at 9.
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they failed to establish Bennefield's reliability as a witness despite the fact
that he was the named informant in the affidavit. As such, his reliability
would be a factor in establishing probable cause for the search warrant to be
issued.97 Simply naming him in the affidavit as the informant was
insufficient without more corroboration," and since Calixte worked in
Boston College's Information Technology Department, he would have

access to computers belonging to third parties. Therefore, the police failed
to link the computer used for the alleged illegal activities to Calixte.

Finding no nexus between the evidence submitted in the affidavit and the
validity of the search warrant, the court reasoned that sending the e-mails
from a public e-mail service did not appear to satisfy the elements required
to prove the crime of obtaining computer services by fraud or
misrepresentation, or the crime of unauthorized access to a computer
system. 99 As a result of the unlawful search of Calixte's room and seizure

97. Id.
98. Id. at 8-9. The court found that the statement in the affidavit indicating Bennefield had been a
reliable witness in another investigation was insufficient to evaluate his reliability as a witness for this
search warrant. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 403 Mass. 483, 486 (1988).
99. In re Riccardo Calixte, supra note 71, at 6; accord United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452
(C.D. Cal. 2009). Drew, a forty-seven year old female, created a fictitious social network account on
MySpace using the pseudonym "Josh Evans" and, in violation of MySpace's terms of use, Drew posted
a picture of a sixteen-year old male without his permission. Id. The account of "Josh Evans" was
created in order to cyber-bully Megan Meier, who was a thirteen-year-old former friend of Drew's
daughter. Id. For a number of days, Drew used the "Evans" account to persuade Meier that "Evans"
liked her. Id. Soon after, "Evans" informed Meier that he was moving, that no longer liked her, and that
"the world would be a better place without her in it." Id. Meier took the words literally and committed
suicide. Id. Drew was indicted by a federal Grand Jury and convicted of a misdemeanor under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) of 1984 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)) for using
a computer in interstate commerce without authorization and in excess of authorized use. Id. at 453.
Judge Wu overturned Drew's conviction, opining that
Treating a violation of a website's terms of service, without more, to be sufficient to
constitute "intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or exceed[ing]
authorized access" would result in transforming [the CFAA] into an overwhelmingly
overbroad enactment that would convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet users
into misdemeanant criminals.
Id. at 466 (citation omitted). In the aftermath of Megan Meier's suicide and the facts surrounding it, the
Missouri Legislature expanded its existing laws prohibiting harassment to include bullying via the
Internet by means of a computers and other electronic equipment. See Missouri Lawmakers Pass Bill
Against Cyber-harassment After MySpace Suicide Case, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2008, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/17/nation/na-suicidel7. As of October 2009, twenty other states
have enacted similar legislation. See Nat'l Coal. Against Censorship, Cyberbullying: Statutes and
Policies (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.ncac.org/List-of-Cyberbullying-Statutes-and-Policies.
(listing
state statutes that mandate school board to adopt cyberbullying policies). Additionally, in April 2009,
U.S. Representative Linda Sanchez (D-CA) introduced the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,
H.R. 1966, 111 th Cong. (2009). Section 3 of the bill would criminalize cyberbullying. The pertinent
part of the proposed bill provides: "Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a
person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." H.R. 1966 § 3.
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of his personal property, Calixte was deprived not only of his cell phone
and other electronic equipment, but also of the use of his computer for
academic and other purposes.
One of the most important issues raised in Calixte is whether the need for
surveillance and monitoring has been appropriately balanced with
legitimate student privacy rights. As previously noted,1°° terms of use

policies concerning university technology resources generally provide little
or no privacy protection for campus e-mail sent using the university's
technology resources.101 The same would be true of phone conversations
and text 102messages transmitted using university networks and other
resources.
Beyond the limitations on the expectation of privacy contained in the

terms of use policies, federal, state and common laws may provide some
guidance for the nature and extent of the privacy rights of students and
others where campus surveillance and monitoring occurs. The question
surrounding these laws involves a discussion of these rights as they relate to
information stored on computers and other electronic devices.
III.

FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS

A. The United States Constitution
The United States' constitutional source of the right to privacy is an
implied or penumbral right'0 3-rather than an expressed or enumerated

right-found

in the

Fourth,' °4 Fifth,'0 5 Ninth, 106 and Fourteenth0 7

100. See PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND BUSINESS CONDUCT, supra note 81.

101. See id
102. See id.
103. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of birth control devices and the giving of advice regarding their
use. Id. at 486. The Court further recognized that the Bill of Rights provided us with certain penumbral
rights that created "zones of privacy," locations where privacy is expected. Id. at 484.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ").

106. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Amendments.
These rights apply to unwarranted intrusions by the
government and apply to students attending public or state universities
where campus police exercise the same police authority and power as state
and local police. 10 8 In the absence of an exception, these rights do not apply
to private universities. An exception may apply if a court determines that
the alleged activity of the private university arose out of an act by a private
university that was "fairly attributable to the State" (known as the "state
action" requirement) and consequently subject to federal law.10 9
Exceptions may also apply where private universities summon local or
state police to assist campus police, or where a state statute transfers some
of its state police authority and power to private university campus police
departments, such as the right to make arrests.' 10 Therefore, if a private
university's campus police department has been granted this statutory
authority and subsequently engages in electronic surveillance, the methods
employed should not violate privacy rights protected by the United States
Constitution. Even if a student cannot seek redress under the Federal

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (finding the suspension of nine Ohio public school
students for up to ten days without a hearing to be a denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
108. See, e.g., Arizona State University, ASU Police Officers' Legal Authority and Jurisdiction,
http://cfo.asu.edu/police-jurisdiction (last visited May 25, 2010).
ASU Police Officers are state certified, and have the same powers as any police officer in
the State of Arizona. All police officers in the State of Arizona, including ASU police
officers, have the authority to enforce state and federal laws within limits imposed by the
state and federal constitutions and judicial rulings.
Id.
109. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 42 (1982); see also Zachariah Logodice v. Trs. of
Central Maine Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that disciplinary actions of the Central
Maine Institute, a private high school under contract with the State of Maine, constituted "state action"
and were therefore subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny).
110. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C, § 63 (2010).
The colonel may ... at the request of an officer of a college, university, other educational institution or
hospital licensed pursuant to section fifty-one of chapter one hundred and eleven, appoint employees of
such college, university, other educational institution or hospital as special state police officers. Such
special state police officers shall ... have the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for
any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures owned, used or occupied by such college,
university, or other institution or hospital.
Id.
The governing board of each private institution of higher education is authorized to establish ... a
campus police department .... Except as such provisions apply exclusively to public institutions or
employees, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to the appointment and employment of officers,
operation, powers, duties and jurisdiction of private campus police departments, and such departments
shall be subject to and enjoy the benefits of this chapter.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-232.1 (2010) (citation omitted).
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Constitution for the invasion of privacy interests by campus police, he the
student may nevertheless find protection
under state constitutions and
12
statutes 11 or the common law of torts.
B. Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime
Statistics Act of 1990
The essential provisions of the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus
Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act of 1990113 ("Clery Act")
require post-secondary institutions receiving federal student aid to: (1) set
policies that warn the campus of potential threats of violence1 4 ; (2) report
annual campus crime statistics to the university community' 5; (3) keep
daily campus crime logs 16; and (4) describe their campus security
policies. 11 7 The Clery Act also contains privacy provisions that prohibit
universities from identifying the victims of crimes and persons accused of
committing crimes s and from disclosing confidential or privileged
information. 119
Additionally, each year, universities must submit a copy of their security
report to the Secretary of the Department of Education. 20 The annual
security report must include a statement of the university's current policies
and procedures for students and other university members to report crimes
or emergencies, as well as its policy for responding to such reports. The list
of the other required contents of the annual report is quite
extensive and
1 21
statistics.
and
statements
mandatory
additional,
to
relates
If a university fails to file its annual security report, the Secretary is
authorized to impose a fine of at least $27,500 for each violation of the

111. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § I B ("A person shall have a right against unreasonable,

substantial or serious interference with his privacy. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to
enforce such right and in connection therewith to award damages.").
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1997) (describing the torts of "Intrusion upon

Seclusion," "Public Disclosure of Private Facts Causing Injury to Reputation," "Publicity Placing
Another in a False Light," and "Misappropriation of a Person's Name or Likeness Causing Injury to
Reputation").
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(15) (2006).

114. Id.§ 1092(f(1) .
115. Id.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.§ 1092(f(7) .
Id.§ 1092(f)(10 ) .
Id. § 1092(f)(5).
Id. § 1092(f)(1)(A) (H).
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For instance,

Eastern Michigan University paid a fine of $350,000 in 2008123 the largest
to date under the Clery Act 124 for failing to inform the campus of the
murder of a student in her dorm room. Exacerbating the violation, Eastern
Michigan officials reported1 25 that there was no "foul play" involved, and

staff members told students there was "no reason to worry."' 126 Since 1990,
Congress has passed several amendments modifying and expanding the
requirements of the annual security report.127
C. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986

Two of the most significant federal statutes addressing privacy rights as
they pertain to electronic surveillance and disclosure of electronic
communications are the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA)12 12and
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
9
(FERPA).

The ECPA amended existing federal anti-wiretapping statutes in order to
expand privacy protections to new electronic communication methods such
as cellular phones and e-mail. 130 In general, the ECPA applies to electronic
surveillance activities of the government. 131 The ECPA can apply to private
122. Id. § 1092(f)( 13) ; Adjustment of Civil Monetary penalties for Inflation, 67 Fed. Reg. 222 (Nov. 18,
2002) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 36).
123. Eastern Michigan University to Pay $350,000 Fine for Clery Act Violation, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., June 6, 2008, http://chronicle.com/article/Eastern-Michigan-U-to-Pay-/41112/.
124. Id.
125. Sara Lipkin, A University Is Accused of Hushing Up a Murder, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar.
23, 2007, http:/chronicle.com/article/A-University-Is-Accused-of/12175.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, § 10(e), 105 Stat.
123, 125 (changing annual security reporting period from academic year to calendar year); Higher
Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 486(c), 106 Stat. 448, 621-23 (annual security
report must include a statement of the university's policies and provisions for the victims of sexual
assaults); Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 486(e), 112 Stat. 1581
(expanding the categories of crimes that must be reported); Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1601, 114 Stat. 1464, 1537 38 (universities must make
available public sex offender registration information for sex offenders on campus); see also New
Campus Security Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 668.46 (2010) (annual security report must include statistics
for hate crimes, notification requirements regarding missing students, and a description of the
university's emergency response and evacuation procedures).
128. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006).
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) ("Buckley Amendment").
130. Compare Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat.
197, ivith 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
131. Jamie Lewis Keith, The War on Terrorism Affects the Academy: Principal Post-September 11,
2001 Federal Anti-Terrorism Statutes, Regulations, and Policies that Apply to Colleges and
Universities,30 J.C. & U.L. 239, 303 05 (2004).
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universities if a court determines that the university engaged in a state
action, enlisted the aid of outside law enforcement agencies, or if its campus
police department was granted local or state police powers and authority.132
Recall, for example, that Boston College enlisted the assistance of the
Massachusetts State Police to assist in the Calixte investigation. 133 State
action requirements aside, university counsels have indicated that
they will
34
treat the ECPA as if it applies to e-mail and voicemail systems.
Title I of the ECPA135 prohibits any person from intercepting
intentionally or without authorization a wire, oral or other electronic
communication 136 affecting interstate or foreign commerce and from
disclosing the contents of those communications. 137 The interception under
the ECPA must be effectuated simultaneously with the transmission of the
communication. 38 This requirement would not apply to interceptions of
communications in storage since the transmission would have already
occurred. 139 The requirement under Title I that "interception" of an email
14
or other electronic communication be authorized by a search warrant 0
applies to both federal1 41 and state 142 law enforcement agencies.

132. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006); Lugar, 457 U.S. at928 29.
133. Brief of Respondent, In re Search Warrant Executed on March 30, 2009 at the Residence of
Riccardo Calixte No. SJ-2009-0212 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2009) (No. 0912SW03), available at
www.eff org/files/filenode/inresearchBC/BC-oppositiontomotiontoquash.pdf
134. See,
e.g.,
Catholic
Univ.
of
Am.,
Summary
of
Federal
Laws,
http://counsel.cua.edu/fedlaw/Ecpa.cfmn (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (stating that"TitleI8 U.S.C. §
2510(15) extends the Act's protection to university-owned telephone, e-mail and Internet systems," but
providing no support for the assertion); Keith, supra note 131, at 303-04 n.334 (2004) ("[l]t is prudent
for a college or university to interpret the ECPA as applying to all communications on its
e-mail and
voicemail systems, whether opened or unopened, until otherwise advised by a court that has considered
the institution's particular situation.").
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2006).
136. Id. § 2510 (-[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, data, or intelligence of any nature by
a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce."). The most notable exclusions are the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication
that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit and any wire or oral
communication. Id. § 2510(12)(A)-(B).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
138. Frasier v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003).
139. See Jessica Belskis, Applying the Wiretap Act to Online Communications After United States v.
Councilman, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COMMERCE & TECH. 18 (2006).

140. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2010) (describing the requirements for an application for the search
warrant). There is some disagreement about whether communications in electronic storage will trigger
the warrant requirement and possible violation of ECPA. See, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003), aff'd, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 418 F.3d 67 (1st
Cir. 2005) (holding that
interception of a communication in storage is an offense under the Wiretap Act).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006) ("Authorization for Interception of Wire, Oral or Electronic
Communications.").
142. Id.§2516(2).
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The prohibition against "interception" contained in Title I potentially
applies to a public or private university that intercept and disclose, without

proper authorization, the contents of a student's e-mail or other electronic
communication to a third party, such as faculty member. If law
enforcement seeks to compel a university to disclose the content of an email message stored on its servers, most cases require a search warrant.
Civil and criminal sanctions are allowed by the ECPA.14 3 Additionally,
Title I prohibits an Internet service provider (ISP) from intentionally

disclosing the contents of a communication
to any person or entity other
144
than the addressee or its intended recipient.
Title II of the ECPA 145 makes it unlawful for a person or entity providing
any electronic communication service to the public to knowingly divulge t
the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service
without authorization.14 6

This applies to data stored on disks or other

storage devices by a person or entity providing
they qualify as providing an
148
' 147
"electronic

communication

service ,

available

to

the

public.

Universities that allow students, other members of its community, and the
public-at-large to access e-mails through university computers or devices,
either on and off the campus, will likely satisfy this qualification; however,
relevant case law is sparse.1 9 Therefore, it may in some cases be a
violation of a student's privacy under the ECPA for a university to access
and disclose the contents of a student's e-mail to a third party without
proper authorization. Such authorization may derive from the prior express

143. Id. § 2511(4)(a). Penalties include fines or imprisonment for up to five years. Id.
144. Id. § 251 1(3)(a).
145. Id. §§ 2701 12 ("Stored Communications Act").
146. Id. § 2702(a)(1). See Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1998). UOP
hired Andersen to perform a systems integration project in 1992. Id. at 1042. During the project,
Andersen employees had access to and used UOP's internal e-mail system to communicate with each
other, with UOP, and with third parties. Id. Dissatisfied with Andersen's performance, UOP terminated
the project in December 1993. Id. UOP disclosed the contents of Andersen's e-mails to the Wall Street
Journal which published them. Id. Andersen brought suit under § 2702(a)(1) arguing that UOP
provided an electronic communication service to the public making the disclosure of the e-mails
unlawful. Id. at1042-43. The court disagreed and dismissed the suit, reasoning that UOP's e-mail
system was used solely for internal communications only utilized its e-mail system for internal
communications and therefore did not provide a service to the public. Id. at1045.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006) (defining "electronic communications service" as "any service which
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications").
148. Id. § 2702(a)(1); see Andersen Consulting LLP, 991 F. Supp. 1041; Robert Konop v. Hawaiian
Airlines, 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001).
149. One university attorney concludes that, in light of current uncertainty regarding the applicability of
the ECPA to the university environment, "it
is prudent for a college or university to interpret the ECPA
as applying to all communications on its e-mail and voice-mail systems, whether opened or unopened,
until otherwise advised by a court that has considered the institution's particular situation." Keith, supra
note 131, at 303 n.334.
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consent of the student, a clear written policy regarding computer terms of
use, 50 or a log-on banner. Disclosure may also be lawful in case of
emergency where disclosure is made to a government law enforcement
agency. 151 Here, again, the university's terms of use policy should clearly
and conspicuously inform the users of its system that the university reserves
the right to access stored electronic communications.
The sanctions for
52
violations of Title II are similar to those of TitleI. 1
Title III 53 applies to wiretaps, pen registers, 154 and trap and trace
devices. 155 Before law enforcement uses these devices can to collect real
time information, a search warrant must be obtained. The order will
ordinarily be granted only if the information sought relates to a criminal
investigation. As for government access to e-mail and other electronic
communications held in storage, the ECPA has a special rule regarding
search warrants. 56 To access e-mail that has been in storage for 180 days
or less, law enforcement must obtain a search warrant in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 157 or its state law equivalent, in
order to compel a service provider to disclose the contents of the
communication. 58 However, e-mail in storage for more than 180 days is
considered stale and thus may be accessed merely by subpoena or court
order. 159 Critics of this provision argue that it is outdated, reasoning that
Fourth Amendment protection should not depend on the age of e-mail or its
status (opened versus unopened). 160 They further argue that since Congress

150. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (2006) ("A provider... may divulge the contents of a communication...
with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or an intended recipient of such communication
.... "); see also S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 37 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3591 ("These
exceptions permit disclosure ... with the lawful consent of the sender or the addressee or an intended
recipient of such communication .... ).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) (2006) ("A provider... may divulge the contents of a communication...
to a governmental entity if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of
death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications
relating to the emergency."); see id. § 2701(c).
152. Id. § 2701(a)-(b).
153. Id. §§ 3121-3127 ("Pen Register Act").
154. A pen register records phone numbers dialed as outgoing calls. Id § 3127(3).
155. A trap and trace device records the phone numbers from which incoming calls originate. Id §
3127(4).
156. Id. § 2703.
157. FED. R. CRiM. P. 41.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
159. Id. § 2703(b), (d); see also, United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770-71 (C.D. 111.2009).
160. James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Standards for Government Access
Communications andAssociated Data, 970 PRACTICING L. INST. 687, 701 (2009).
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passed the ECPA in 1986, technology has advanced to the point where web-

based e-mail is stored and161saved on third party servers regardless of the email's age or other status.

The September 11, 2001 attack on the United States led to the passage of
the USA PATRIOT Act by Congress. 162 This Act and several other federal

statutes163 have amended the ECPA by broadening the surveillance powers
of the Federal Government in cases involving suspected threats of
terrorism, which effectively reduces the privacy rights provided by the
ECPA. 16 4 Thus, if the government believes a university student or another
member of the university community is involved in terrorist activities
against the United States or its interests, privacy rights granted under the
ECPA may be suspended in the interest of national security.161
In addition, there are exceptions to Title I (also applicable to Title II and

III) 166 that have possible applications to universities. One exception applies
to an ISP 167 and provides that an online operator, officer, employer, or agent
of a provider of wire or electronic communication service may, in the
ordinary course of its business, intercept, disclose, or use an electronic
communication necessary to the rendition of their service or to the

161. Id. at 707.
162. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 47
U.S.C.). The USA PATRIOT Act has been the subject of much discussion and, in some cases, criticism
regarding its effect on individual privacy. See, e.g., EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA
PATRIOT
Act,
Oct.
31,
2001,
http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/20011031 eff usapatriot analysis.php.
163. See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C). CALEA further
defines the existing statutory obligation of telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement in
executing electronic surveillance pursuant to court order or other lawful authorization. Id. The
objective of CALEA implementation is to preserve law enforcement's ability to conduct lawfully
authorized electronic surveillance while preserving public safety, the public's right to privacy, and the
telecommunications industry's competitiveness.
See About the CALEA Implementation Unit,
http://askcalea.net/aboutus.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FIFSA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2006)
(establishing procedures for the authorization of electronic surveillance for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence)).
164. USA PATRIOT Act, § 505, 115 Star. at 278 (amending § 2516 of ECPA to expand the authority of
federal agencies to intercept wire, oral and electronic communications in suspected cases of terrorism).
Section 202 of the PATRIOT Act allows interceptions in cases involving computer fraud and abuse. See
id. § 202.
165. See, e.g., id. § 505, 115 Stat. at 365-66 (requiring disclosure of subscriber information or
electronic communication transaction records, but not the content of messages themselves, in response
to an FBI request); cf John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 885 (2d Cir. 2008) (partially
invalidating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709(c), 3511 (b) (2006)).
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a) (2006).
167. See id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
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protection of the rights or property of that service. This exception applies
to both internal providers, such as Boston College in Calixte, and external
providers such as AT&T, Yahoo, AOL, and Verizon. Random observing
and monitoring of electronic communications would not be allowed under
this exception unless mechanical or quality control was being
investigated. 68 This exception could apply to Boston College, since its
terms of use policy 69 specifically allows it to intercept and disclose the
contents of an individual's electronic data, software, or communication files
(including e-mails) where a legitimate or urgent situation exists that is
sufficiently strong enough to trump Boston College's commitment to honor
the privacy of the members of its community. 170 Such situations include
maintaining the integrity of its system (e.g., tracking viruses), protecting
system security, investigating possible improper use of its system,
protecting property rights, and responding to legal obligations (e.g.,
subpoenas). It would appear that Boston College's actions would result
from an investigation to ensure the security of its electronic
communications system. Accordingly, for Boston College to fall within
this exception it would have to prove that its access and disclosure of
Calixte's e-mails were done to protect Boston College's rights or property
interests. 171
Another relevant exception allows the monitoring and interception of an
e-mail or other electronic communication where the originator, addressee,
or intended recipient of an electronic communication has given the ISP
prior consent to intercept. 172 Such consent could be provided in a computer
use policy or a subscription agreement, or may be displayed on a login
banner. Boston College's terms of use policy 1 73 would likely meet the
requirements of this exception and would apply to the school's interception
and disclosure of Calixte's e-mails. A claim of a violation of privacy rights
would be precluded unless the policy contains a term prohibiting
"electronic 'snooping' or the use of technological resources for the purposes
174
of satisfying idle curiosity about the affairs of others.,

168. See United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d. 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling that American Airlines
acted as a service provider under this exception when one of its
employees investigated discrepancies in
reservations made by a travel agent on an online travel reservations system it maintained).
169. See PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND BUSINESS CONDUCT, supra note 81.
170. See id.
171. Seeid.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 251 ](2)(d), (3)(b)(ii) (2006)).
173. See PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND BUSINESS CONDUCT, supra note 81.
174. Id.
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A third exception applies to any device, such as an extension telephone
or other monitoring device (computers are not mentioned), furnished to ,and
used by, a subscriber or user of wire or electronic communications services
in the ordinary course of business. 175 It follows that an employer in the
ordinary course of its business could use a monitoring device obtained from
a telephone company or other ISP to intercept employee communications
transmitted in the workplace to determine if they are related to work or
business. Prior consent or a monitoring policy of which employees have
knowledge would be a prerequisite for this exception. The consent or
policy should expressly provide for monitoring of both business and
personal calls, otherwise the exception could be limited to communications
only of a business nature.176 Courts have not yet definitively ruled whether
this exception would apply to universities intercepting communications of
students who, like Calixte, are also university employees. However, as
discussed earlier, a university could intercept under other exceptions to the
ECPA.
In the recent case of City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 177 the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed important issues related to privacy protections
under the Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act involved
in accessing and disclosing the contents of text messages. Although the
case involved state action and public employees, the decision could impact
private universities that engage in activities that qualify as state actions as
78
discussed earlier.
Jeff Quon was a police officer (SWAT team member) with the City of
Ontario Police Department (OPD). 179 Quon, along with other police
officers and City employees, were issued alphanumeric pagers to send and
receive text messages."o The City's terms of use policy allowed it to
monitor and log all e-mail and Internet usage with or without notice.' 8' It
also informed City employees that they would have no expectation of
privacy or confidentiality when using Ontario's computers or technology

175. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a).
176. See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d. 577 (11th Cir. 1983) (where the employer's policy
applied only to business-related calls, intercepting the personal call made by the employee to a friend
violated the Federal Wiretap Act); see also Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d
914 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
177. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
178. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
179. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2624.
180. Id. at 2625.
181. Id.
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resources. 82 Although text messages were not expressly included in the
policy, the City informed its employees, including its police, that1 83text
messages would be treated similar to e-mails and thus subject to audit.
The City's contract with Arch Wireless, its ISP, limited the number of
text messages employees could send and receive per month. 184 Exceeding
the limit would result in additional fees.' 85 Quon and other officers were
aware of the terms of use policy but were informally told that as long as
they paid overage to the City, they could send and receive personal texts
without being subject to audits.1 86 Quon continuously exceeded the contract
allowance and reimbursed the City for the overage.187
Nevertheless, the OPD Chief of Police obtained the transcripts of Quon's
text messages stored with Arch without a search warrant to determine if the
limits were too low and if Quon was paying for work-related rather than
personal messages. 88 The transcripts revealed that of the 456 messages
sent or received by Quon in one month, fifty-seven were work-related while
the others were personal in nature. 189 As a result, Quon was disciplined. 190
He filed suit in federal district court and alleged violations of his privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the California
Constitution, and the Stored Communications Act for releasing the stored
transcripts and their contents to the OPD without Quon's consent. 191 Ajury
decided that since the Chiefs purpose in obtaining the transcripts was to
determine the efficacy of the limits and not whether Quon was involved in
misconduct, the search was reasonable. 192 Relying in part on O'Connor v.

182. Id.
183. Id.
In this case, for instance, an email sent on a City computer was transmitted through the
City's own data servers, but a text message sent on one of the City's pagers was
transmitted using wireless radio frequencies from an individual pager to a receiving
station owned by Arch Wireless. It was routed through Arch Wireless' computer
network, where it remained until the recipient's pager or cellular telephone was ready to
receive the message, at which point Arch Wireless transmitted the message from the
transmitting station nearest to the recipient. After delivery, Arch Wireless retained a copy
on its computer servers. The message did not pass through computers owned by the City.
Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2626.
189. Id.
190. Id.

191. 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev d, 529 F.3d 892,899 (9th Cir. 2008).
192. Quon, 529 F.3d at 899 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'g, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1128 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd,
130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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Ortega, 193 the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the text messages and that
the scope of the search
194
was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded, finding
the search of Quon's text messages was reasonable and did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 95 According to the Court, the search was motivated
by a legitimate work-related purpose and was not excessive in scope.196
The Court assumed without deciding that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his text messages. 197 As for private universities
and its employees, the Court also concluded that the search would be
regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context. 19
Seemingly, this would include universities like Boston College and student
employees like Calixte.
D. Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act of 1974
The Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act of 1974 (FERPA) 199
applies to both public and private colleges and universities receiving federal
funds.20 0 It is to be noted that once a child is eighteen years old and a
student at a university, the rights under FERPA benefit the student rather
than the parent or guardian. 20 FERPA prevents disclosure of information
contained in a university student's education records.20 2 Education records
are defined to include any document that contains information directly
related to a student that is maintained by or on behalf of an educational

193. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (holding that public employees have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their desks, file cabinets and other work-related areas subject to Fourth
Amendment protection). The Court noted that "[t]he operational realities of the workplace... may make
some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable .. .[and] may be reduced by virtue of actual
office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation." Id. at 717. The Court further noted that
given the variety of environments in which employees work, whether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 718.
194. Quon, 529 F.3d at 908 09.
195. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633.
196. Id. at 2632.
197. Id. at 2633.
198. Id. (citing O'Connor, 480 U.S. at732) (Scalia, J. concurring).
199. 20 U.S.C § 1232g (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 (2010). FERPA is also known as the Buckley
Amendment and is named after Senator James Buckley of New York, one of its sponsors. See e.g., Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr., Family Educational Right to Privacy Act (Buckley Amendment),
http://epic.org/privacy/education/ferpa.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
200. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (2006).
201. Id. § 1232h(c)(5)(B).
202. Id. § 1232g.
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institution. 20 3 Absent a student's written consent, 20 4 information contained
in a student's education records cannot be disclosed to others, subject to
certain exceptions. 205
However, records of incident reports created and maintained by campus
police for law enforcement purposes are not part of a student's educational
records and constitute a major exception to FERPA. 206 Consequently, these
reports may be shared with external law enforcement agencies without
posing issues of student privacy under FERPA. Since Boston College's
campus police were investigating the allegations against Calixte to
determine whether he was engaged in criminal activity, it is likely that
Boston College did not violate his privacy rights under FERPA by
disclosing the evidence to the Newton police without his permission.
Also recall that officials at Virginia Tech were prevented by FERPA
20 7
from informing Cho's parents about his precarious mental stability.
Cho's written consent was required before his condition could be disclosed
to his parents. Arguably, even if they were informed, it probably would not
have prevented his actions.
FERPA allows a university to disclose information about a student if
ordered to do so by a court or valid subpoena, provided that the student is
notified of the order or subpoena in advance of compliance by the
university. 208 An exception to the consent requirement arises where the
issuing court orders non-disclosure of the contents, which could be the case
with a grand jury subpoena. 209 The same would be true for investigations or
prosecutions of terrorism under the USA PATRIOT Act. 2'0 FERPA would
also allow disclosure of contents if a "health or safety emergency" exists
and "knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health and
safety of the student or other persons. 2 1 Thus, if Calixte presented a threat

203. Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
204. Id. § 1232g(a)(6)(b)(1).
205. Id. § 1232g(a)(6)(b)(1)(A)-(J).
206. Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii).
207. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
208. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) (2006).
209. Id. § 1232g(b)(1)(J).
210. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 507, 115 Star. 272 (2001) (amending FERPA to allow the U.S. Attorney
General to obtain, upon application to a court of competent jurisdiction, education records relevant to an
investigation or prosecution of domestic or foreign acts of terrorism).
211. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(J).
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to the safety of Bennefield, and there was information in Calixte's
education records that could protect Bennefield from harm, Boston College
could disclose it to Bennefield.21 2
If a university violates FERPA, the U.S. Secretary of Education has the
authority to withhold funds under any applicable program, issue a cease and
desist order compelling compliance, or terminate funding for further non213
compliance.
Furthermore, FERPA does not provide students with a
private cause of action for violation of its provisions. 2 4 Instead, students
who believe they have a claim for a FERPA violation must file a complaint
with the Secretary of Education in whom FERPA vests the power to
enforce its regulations.2 5
IV. STATE PRIVACY LAWS

State privacy laws grant rights similar to those provided by the federal
laws discussed above. For example, Article IV of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights provides rights similar to those provided by FERPA
and the Fourth Amendment with respect to search and seizure privacy in the
context of education and academic records, searches of dorm rooms,
216
computers and electronic communications.
Massachusetts also protects
individuals against "unreasonable, substantial or serious interference" with
their privacy. 17

212. Id.
213. See id. § 1232g(b)(7)(f); see also 34 C. F.R. § 99.67 (2010).
214. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273-74 (2002). The respondent, a student at Gonzaga,
wished to become an elementary school teacher. Id. at 277. One of the requirements was for him to
obtain an affidavit of good moral character from Gonzaga University. Id. Gonzaga's teacher
certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the respondent had engaged in sexual
misconduct, whereupon the University prompted an investigation, contacted the state agency in charge
of certification, and identified the respondent by name, all of which resulted in the respondent not
receiving the necessary affidavit. Id He brought suit claiming the information released without his
consent violated FERPA under Section 1232g. Id. The Court held that there is no private right of action
under the provisions of FERPA. Id. at 289.
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(7), (f)-(g).
216. MASS. CONST. art. XV (2010).
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are
contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by
oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in
suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be
not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities
prescribed by the laws.
Id.; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214 § 1B (2010).
217. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 214 § lB.
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California law provides comparable rights. A provision of its Education
Code requires schools to give written notice to parents of their rights and
responsibilities with respect to school records. 218 In addition to other rights,
the California Constitution recognizes an "inalienable right" to privacy. 219
States also afford universities the right to adopt and implement their own
student privacy rules and policies, especially as they relate to dorm rooms,
educational records, electronic communications, and the use of university
resources. Recall the discussion above concerning the contract between the
university and the student and the importance of the student handbook as a
source for identifying student privacy rights.
V. COMMON LAW TORTS FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which
must be taken for the protection of the person. and for2 20securing to the
individual what Judge Cooley calls the right "to be let alone."

When this quotation was written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in
their 1890 article "The Right to Privacy," there were no laws or
constitutional provisions that were considered to recognize an individual's
"right to privacy."
However, Warren and Brandeis may have been
prophetic when they alluded to the significance of "recent inventions and
business methods., 221 They may have envisioned a time when those
"inventions and business methods" would create an environment where
private and personal information are shared via e-mail, text messages, social
networks, 222 blogs, and other means of electronic communications, thus
necessitating laws designed to protect privacy when threatened or invaded.
The federal and state laws discussed herein may not be sufficient for
such purposes. Recall that privacy rights implied in the U.S. Constitution
generally apply only to government intrusions, except where private entities
engage in "state action," and FERPA does not provide a private cause of
action. Consequently, students like Calixte who believe their right to
privacy has been violated must pursue alternative legal theories. One set of

218. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49063 (2009).
219. CAL. CONST. art. 1,§ I ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are ... pursuing and obtaining ... privacy.").

220. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890).
221. Id.

222. For a discussion of the privacy controversy involving social networks, including those of Facebook
and Google, see Jennifer Martinez, Laivmakers Grill Internet Firms over Privacy Protection, L.A.

TIMEs, July 28, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/28/business/la-fi-tech-hearing-20100728;
also Posting of Jennifer Valentino

DeVries to Wall St. J.

Blog (July 21,

http://blogs.wsi .con/digits/2010/07/21/facebook-touts-its-500-million-friends/.

see

2010, 17:56 EST),
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possible theories includes the four common law intentional torts for
invasion of privacy found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts223 and
224
advanced by Professor Prosser in his seminal article on privacy.
225
These intentional torts include: Intrusion upon Seclusion;
Misappropriation of a Person's Name or Likeness Causing Injury to
Reputation; 226 Publicity Given to Private Facts; 227 Publicity Placing Another
in a False Light. 228 The following discussion describes the elements
required for each of these torts and their viability as legal theories for
students seeking to hold a university liable for invasion of privacy. It
should be emphasized that the first requirement in all such suits is to
establish the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
A. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Intentionally intruding, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns may give rise to
liability to the other for invasion of privacy if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. 2 29 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion
usually involves entering a private room or area without authorization,
opening private personal mail, searching a safe or wallet, examining a
private bank account or compelling by a forged court order to permit
inspection of one's personal documents. 230 As discussed above, absent an
emergency or other exception, a university cannot search the contents of a
student's dorm room without obtaining a duly authorized search warrant
from a local court. 231 In Calixte, Boston College seemingly obtained an
authorized search warrant from the Newton District Court that was
subsequently held to lack sufficient probable cause. 232 Since there are no
cases on point, it is mere speculation as to what would be the result if
Calixte sought to hold Boston College liable for intrusion upon his
seclusion and a violation of his privacy resulting in damages. At a
minimum, he would need to prove that (1) he held a reasonable expectation

223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652 B E (1977).
224. William Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. § 652C.
Id. § 652D.
Id. § 652E.
Id. § 652B.
Id. § 652B cmt. b.
See infra Part II.A.
In re Riccardo Calixte, No. SJ-2009-0212, supra note 71, at 11.
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of privacy in his dorm room and in his electronic communications, 233 (2)
that the warrant obtained was invalid notwithstanding that its duly
authorization, and finally, (3) that Boston College's intrusion was
intentional and would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 234
To avoid possible liability for intrusion upon seclusion, universities
employing campus cameras are cautioned to avoid surveillance of dorm
rooms and other private areas, absent a legal justification, and to limit the
use of tracking or monitoring devices (web-bugs, "spy ware" or e-mail
wiretaps) of university-owned electronic equipment to its terms of use
policy or other applicable laws. 35
B. Misappropriation of a Person's Name or Likeness Causing Injury to
Reputation
Misappropriation of a person's name or likeness occurs when one uses
the name or likeness of a living person without their permission, and where
such use results in damage to the person's reputation. This tort usually
involves using another's picture or likeness without their permission for
commercial or non-newsworthy purposes. 236 Consequently, this tort would
233. See Biby v. Bd. of Regents, 419 F.3d 845, 851-52 (8th Cir. 2005) (dismissing invasion of privacy
claims brought by a state university employee against the university after the latter searched the office
computer of the former, in light
of the university's computer terms of use policy which the court found
to negate any reasonable expectation of privacy).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
235. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d. 239, 242 (N.H. 1964) (awarding damages for intrusion upon
seclusion where a landlord installed a hidden camera in his tenant's room and recorded private
conversations).
236. See Howard Stem v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S. 2d 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). This
case involved a plaintiff-the famous radio shock-jock Howard Stern-who ran for Governor of New
York as a publicity stunt. Id. at695. As part of his "campaign," Stern posed for a photograph in which
he exposed his buttocks. Id. Defendant Delphi Internet Services (Delphi), an online news provider,
published Stem's picture without his permission on itsonline news bulletin board with his buttocks
exposed. Id. Delphi claimed itdid so to promote itsnews-related products. Id. at 700. Stern sued for
invasion of privacy alleging that since Delphi published the picture without permission, it resulted in a
misappropriation of his name and likeness thereby causing him iniury. Id at 695. The court disagreed
declaring Stern a public figure whose candidacy was newsworthy with no reasonable expectation of
privacy existed given the facts. Id at 700. Therefore, the Defendant had a First Amendment right to
publish Stem's name and picture in order to advertise or promote its news-related products. Id, see also
Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589 (Ind. 2001). Felsher, a French professor at the
University of Evansville, was fired in 1991 and, six years later, he setup websites and e-mail addresses
that included parts of the names of three university officials, as well as the letters "UE." Id. at 591. He
posted articles in which he alleged that the three were guilty of wrongdoings. Id. He then sent e-mails
to other universities nominating the three university officials for certain teaching positions. Id. He then
directed interested universities to visit his websites, where they could read the articles and the
allegations that he posted. Id. The three officials and the University of Evansville sued Felsher alleging
invasion of privacy. Id. The Court found Felsher guilty of misappropriation of the official's names and
enjoined him from using the three names along with the letters "UE." Id. at 600. However, the
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have limited relevance in suits against a university for alleged invasions of
privacy.
C. Public Disclosure of Private Facts Causing Injury to Reputation
The public disclosure or transmission of highly private or personal
information about another that causes damage to reputation can also give
rise to liability. "Public" disclosure implies publicizing a private fact to a
significant number of individuals rather than to one or a mere few
individuals. The facts made public must be offensive and objectionable to a
reasonable person and of no concern to the public. 237 Although this tort
would not apply to Boston College's role in Calixte, it could apply to
Bennefield were he to claim that visits to gay websites were an intimate or
private activity made public in Calixte's e-mails, thereby deeming the emails offensive and highly objectionable to Bennefield and to a reasonable
person in the same or similar circumstances.
D. Publicity Placing Another in a False Light
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that presents that
person to the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy. 238 Liability for this tort requires the publicity to be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the defendant must have
knowledge of, or act in reckless disregard as to, the falsity of the publicized
matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.239 Proof of
actual damages is not required.240 Instead, the focus is on whether the false
depiction of the plaintiff by the defendant subjected the plaintiff to ridicule,
contempt, or hatred. The requirement of knowledge of or recklessness as to
the truth or falsity of the matter publicized would probably eliminate
Boston College from any liability for this tort, unless a court were to
describe Boston College's investigations of Bennefield's allegations as,
"sketchy' 241 and "troublingly weak, ' , 42 as the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court described, and interpret those descriptions as "reckless"
behavior resulting in a disregard as to the truth or falsity of the allegations.

injunction did not prohibit future nominations Felsher might send in his own name. Id.
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. § 652E.
Id.
Id.
In re Riccardo Calixte, No. SJ-2009-0212, supra note 71, at 8.
Id. at 10.
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Nevertheless, few cases involving universities and false light claims have
been successful.243 Accordingly, the relative value of these torts in cases
against universities for invasion of privacy rights is limited.
VI. CONCLUSION

Short of making the Ivory Tower into an educational fortress, no
combination of precautions and methods exists that would ensure complete
campus safety. Beyond video surveillance and monitoring of campus
electronic technology usage by students, additional methods that have been
suggested for keeping campuses safe include concealed carry provisions,
the use of metal detectors, and the implementation of criminal background
checks.
A. Concealed Carry
The majority of four-year universities allow their campus police to carry
firearms while opposition has been raised at some smaller institutions.244
Would allowing students and faculty to carry concealed weapons enhance
safety or create potentially dangerous situations ending in injury or deaths?
Although there are no statistics arguing for or against arming students and
faculty, the issue is controversial with arguments both in favor and against.
Those in favor argue that it could reduce deaths caused by the acts
resembling those at Virginia Tech, while others emphasize the infrequency
of such incidents combined with the dangers of placing guns in the hands of
students who are drunk or emotionally upset or depressed.245
Utah is the only state that allows those twenty-one years of age or older,
including students, to carry concealed weapons on campus at all public and
private universities. 246 Other state legislatures have proposed statutes that
243. See Collins v. Purdue Univ., 703 F. Supp. 2d 862, 880 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (holding that plaintiff
failed to state a claim for false-light invasion of privacy where Purdue published accurate statements that
a former university student had been charged with an illegal act); Maes v. Folberg, 504 F. Supp. 2d 339,
347 (N.D. I1. 2007) (finding that state university employee enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy
in her workplace computer absent a terms of use policy indicating otherwise); Anderson v. Vanderbilt
Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52381, at *46 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2010) (holding that claim for falselight invasion of privacy fails where a notation that a student cheated on an exam was placed on his
transcript indicating an honor code violation).
244. Marcella Bombardieri, Campus Police Renew Call to Carry Arms, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 28, 2007,
at Al.

245. Pat
Doyle,
More
Guns, Safer
Campus?, STARTRIBUNE,
Apr.
16,
http://www.startribune.com/politics/state/i 7833874.html.
246. See Utah Only State to Allow Guns at Colleges, MSNBC, Apr. 28,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18355953/.

2008,
2007,
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would allow students to carry concealed firearms on campus, but none have
been successful.24 Students for Concealed Carry on Campus (SCCC) is a
student organization with over sixty chapters in the United States with a
membership of over 42,000 students, professors, and parents/guardians of
university students. 248 The SCCC strongly advocates allowing students
who are trained in the use of guns to carry them on campus. 249 SCCC lists
twenty-four states "that expressly prohibit carrying concealed guns on
campuses" and fifteen "Right-to-Carry" states "that leave the decision of
concealed carry on entirely to each college/university., 250 Of these fifteen
universities, Colorado State University in Fort Collins and Blue Ridge
Community College in Weyers Cave, Virginia allow concealed carry on
251
campus.
B. Metal Detectors
The use of metal detectors as a deterrent to violence on campus also
raises controversial issues concerning their effectiveness.252
Although
commonplace at many urban high schools, their use on university campuses
has generally been limited to campus events such as concerts, dances and
parties, rather than classrooms, other buildings and dorms.253 Those
favoring metal detectors argue that they are effective in detecting firearms
and knives and may discourage carrying weapons at these events, leading to
fewer acts of violence. 4 They point to incidents such as that which took
place at a Duquesne University student union dance. In that case, the use of

247.

THOMAS HARNISCH, AM. ASSN OF STATE COLLS. & UNIVS. CONCEALED WEAPONS ON STATE
COLLEGE CAMPUSES: IN PURSUIT OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 1 (2009),

available at http://www.aascu.org/media/pm/pdf/pmdecO8.pdf. ("[L]awmakers in 17 states have
introduced measures seeking to relax concealed weapons restrictions on college and university
campuses."); Derek P. Langhauser, Gun Regulation on Campus: UnderstandingHeller and Preparing
for Subsequent Litigation and Legislation, 36 J.C. & UL. 63, 83 (2009) ("[T]wenty states in 2009
considered various reforms to campus weapon laws .....
);see also Janet Elliot,
Texas Senate OKs
Guns on College Campuses Bill Today, HOUS. CHRON.. May 20, 2009, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6432279.html.
248. About Students for Concealed Carry On Campus (SCCC),
http://www.concealedcampus.org/aboutus.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
249. Id.
250. State-by-State, SCCC, http://www.concealedcampus.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
251. Id.
252. Bill Schackner, Colleges Disagree on Use of Metal Detectors, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 20,
2006, available at http://post-gazette.com/pg/06263/723346-298.stm.
253. See
Mass.
Inst.
of
Tech.
Event
Regulations
Metal
Detectors,
http://web.mit.edu/eventguide/eventregulations/metaldetectors.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
254. See Alfonso Jimenez, Metal Detection Worth Its Mettle, CAMPUS SAFETY, Nov. 1, 2006, available
at www. campussafetymagazine. com/Articles/Default.aspx?AriticleID-64
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metal detectors may have prevented a gunman, who was in attendance at
the dance, from shooting and wounding five Duquesne University
basketball players following an argument that began at the dance. 255 Those
opposing of the use of metal detectors respond that metal detectors are not
foolproof, especially on university campuses where most buildings have
numerous entrances and exits. The use of security professionals properly
trained in the use of metal detectors is also imperative. Professionals
should be able to distinguish between a gun or knife and other heavy metal
objects such as a belt buckle. Metal detectors also raise issues of
constitutionality and privacy.
C. Criminal Background Checks
Many universities informally ask incoming students questions on their
admission applications, including "The Common Application, ''256 regarding
whether they have been subject to prior disciplinary actions or criminal
convictions (other than traffic violations), and whether they are on
probation or suspension from another university. 251 Some universities
conduct a formal and extensive criminal background check as a condition
for acceptance and enrollment of incoming students, new faculty and
administration, and new hires. 258 Many universities offering degrees and

255. Jim Ritchie, Five University of Duquesne Basketball Players Shot, PITT. TRIB. REV., Sept. 17,
2006, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/mostread/s_470982.html.
256. See Allen Grove, The Common Application, About.com,
http://collegeapps.about.com/od/glossaryofleyterms/g/CommonApp.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
The Common Application is used for undergraduate admissions by roughly 350 colleges
and universities. Only schools that evaluate applications holistically are allowed to use
the common application; that is, the admissions staff must take into consideration things
like letters of recommendation and the application essay. If a college bases admission
solely on GPA and test
scores, they can not be members of the Common Application.
The Common Application covers several areas: personal data, educational data,
standardized test information, family information, academic honors, extracurricular
activities, work experience, a short answer essay, a personal essay, and criminal history.
Id.
257. Mary Beth Marklein, Should College Applicants Get Background Checks?, USA TODAY, Apr. 4,
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-04-17-blcover N.htm.
258. See, e.g., Yale Univ. Staffing & Career Development
Background Checks,
http://www.yale.edu/hronline/careers/screening/index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
[A]II
offers of employment extended to external candidates have been contingent upon
successful completion of a background check. This includes candidates for management
and professional (M&P) positions, clerical and technical (C&T) positions and service and
maintenance (S&M) positions. Beginning January 1, 2010 the background verification
process was expanded to include postdoctoral/postgraduate fellows and associates, casual
employees, and temporary employees.
Id.; UCLA Human Resources, Procedure 21: Appointment, http://map.ais.ucla.edu/go/1001618 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2011) ("All critical positions are subject to a criminal background check.").
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programs related to law enforcement, medicine and health also require
criminal background checks for incoming students, including the Virginia
Tech Carilion School of Medicine and Research Institute, 259 even though

Virginia Tech does not support criminal background checks for other
undergraduate applicants. 260 A few objections against such background
checks include privacy concerns, negligence in checking, flawed or
incorrect data and discrimination in the form of profiling those with
negative background checks.2 6' Perhaps if criminal background checks had
been in place at Virginia Tech and the University of Alabama they would
have raised warnings about Seung-Hui Cho and Amy Bishop, respectively.
As a result of these incidents, more universities are considering criminal
background checks for all incoming students.262
Other suggestions for protecting the Ivory Tower include but are not
limited to:
*

Engaging medical and mental health professionals with expertise
in identifying and monitoring "at risk" students as well as
training of faculty and staff in the danger signs manifested by
such students;
" Creating and implementing emergency notification systems and
response programs using a variety of methods to alert the
campus, including messages via e-mail, cell phone, text, and
other devices;
" Displaying warnings or notifications on campus media such as
strategically placed large screen plasma televisions;
* Providing surveillance and monitoring of entrances to dorms;
* Impressing upon students the need to lock their rooms and
windows;
* Utilizing campus police patrols;
* Creating student escort services to accompany students to
seeking to return to dorms or other buildings;
* Providing safety seminars and training sessions to students;
* Cultivating mutually beneficial relationships with local and state
police, other emergency agencies, and neighboring universities.

259. See Va. Tech. Carilion Sch. of Med. & Res. Inst., Criminal Background Check and Drug
Screening, http://www.vtc.vt.edu/education/admissions/background check drugscreening.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Va. Tech. Cariion Background Checks].
260. Sarah Watson, Tech Will Not Support Background Checks on Prospective Students, COLLEGIATE
TIMES, May 26, 2010, available at http://www.collegiatetimes.com/stories/15505/tech-will-not-pushfor-background-checks-on-prospective-students.
261. Id.
262. See Va. Tech. Carilion Background Checks, supra note 259.
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As additional security precautions are implemented, the campus
community should also be apprised of its privacy rights. To this end,
universities should ensure that policies regarding issues of computer usage,
monitoring and privacy are disseminated to all members of the campus
community.
In addition, universities should obtain consent before
conducting criminal background checks and adhere to all pertinent laws
such as FERPA, the Clery Act, and other privacy laws.
No security measure or combination of measures can serve as a panacea
for preventing acts of campus violence, which can occur irrespective of the
most intensive prevention efforts. Furthermore, although security should be
appropriate to the level of risk, universities must at the same time strive to
preserve and cultivate the sense of "community." The efforts employed by
universities directed at providing campus safety and protection should be
viewed as prescriptions for prevention of the Virginia Tech-type atrocity.
Despite challenges, universities that are vigilant and persistent in their
efforts can simultaneously respect individual privacy while ensuring a safe
educational environment.

